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Diagonalizing by Fixed–Points
Abstract
A universal schema for diagonalization was popularized by N. S. Yanofsky (2003) in which the
existence of a (diagonolized-out and contradictory) object implies the existence of a fixed-point for a
certain function. It was shown that many self-referential paradoxes and diagonally proved theorems
can fit in that schema. Here, we fit more theorems in the universal schema of diagonalization, such as
Euclid’s theorem on the infinitude of the primes and new proofs of G. Boolos (1997) for Cantor’s
theorem on the non-equinumerosity of a set with its powerset. Then, in Linear Temporal Logic, we
show the non-existence of a fixed-point in this logic whose proof resembles the argument of Yablo’s
paradox. Thus, Yablo’s paradox turns for the first time into a genuine mathematico-logical theorem
in the framework of Linear Temporal Logic. Again the diagonal schema of the paper is used in
this proof; and also it is shown that G. Priest’s inclosure schema (1997) can fit in our universal
diagonal/fixed-point schema. We also show the existence of dominating (Ackermann-like) functions
(which dominate a given countable set of functions—like primitive recursives) using the schema.
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1 Introduction
Cantor’s Diagonal Argument was introduced in his (third proof for the) famous theorem on non–
denumerability of the reals; the argument shows that there can be no surjection from a set A to its
powerset P(A): for any function F : A→P(A) the set DF = {x ∈ A | x 6∈ F (x)} is not in the range of
F because for any a ∈ A we have a ∈ DF ←→ a 6∈ F (a), and so a ∈ (DF \ F (a)) ∪ (F (a) \DF ), whence
DF 6= F (a). This argument shows up also in Russell’s Paradox: the collection R = {x | x 6∈ x} of sets
is not a set, since for any set A we have A ∈ R ←→ A 6∈ A, so A 6= R. One other example is Turing’s
Halting Problem in Computability Theory: if W0,W1,W2, · · · is the family of all re sets (recursively enu-
merable subsets of N), then the set K = {n ∈ N | n 6∈ Wn} is not re, because for any re set Wm we have
m ∈ K ←→ m 6∈ Wm, and so m ∈ (K \Wm)∪ (Wm \K), thus K 6= Wm. It can be seen that the (diagonal)
set K = {n ∈ N | n ∈ Wn} is an re but undecidable set.
Many other theorems in mathematics (logic, set theory, computability theory, complexity theory, etc.)
use diagonal arguments; Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth, and Go¨del’s theorem on the
incompleteness of sufficiently strong and (ω–)consistent theories are two prominent examples. In 2003,
Noson S. Yanofsky published the paper [14] mentioning some earlier descriptions for “many of the
classical paradoxes and incompleteness theorems in a categorial fashion”, in the sense that by using “the
language of category theory (and of cartesian closed categories in particular)” one can demonstrate some
paradoxical phenomena and show the above mentioned theorems of Cantor, Tarski and Go¨del; the
goal of [14] was “to make these amazing results available to a larger audience”. In that paper, a universal
schema has been considered in the language of sets and functions (not categories) and the paradoxes
of the Liar, the strong liar, Russell, Grelling, Richard, Time Travel, and Lo¨b, and the theorems
of Cantor (A   P(A)), Turing (undecidability of the Halting problem, and existence of a non–
re set), Baker-Gill-Solovay (the existence of an oracle O such that PO 6= NPO), Carnap (the
diagonalization lemma), Go¨del (first incompleteness theorem), Rosser (incompleteness of sufficiently
strong and consistent theories), Tarski (undefinability of truth in sufficiently strong languages), Parikh
(existence of sentences with very long proofs), Kleene (Recursion Theorem), Rice (undecidability of non–
trivial properties of recursive functions), and von Neumann (existence of self–reproducing machines) are
shown as instances.
In this paper, we fit some other theorems and proofs into the above mentioned universal schema
of Yanofsky; these include Euclid’s Theorem on the infinitude of the primes, Boolos’ proof of the
existence of some explicitly definable counterexamples to the non–injectivity of functions F : P(A)→ A
for any set A, Yablo’s paradox in a form of a mathematical theorem in the framework of linear temporal
logic as a non–existence of some certain fixed–points, and the existence of dominating functions for a
given countable set of functions like Ackermann’s function which dominates all the primitive recursive
functions. In the rest of the introduction we fix our notation and introduce the common framework.
1.1 Cantor’s Theorem by Fixed–Points
Let B, C and D be arbitrary sets. Any function f : B × C → D corresponds to a function f̂ : C → DB
where f̂(c)(b) = f(b, c) for any b ∈ B and c ∈ C (the set DB consists of all the functions from B to D).
Conversely, for any function F : C → DB there exists some f : B × C → D such that f̂ = F : for any
b ∈ B and c ∈ C let f(b, c) = F (c)(b). In the other words −̂ : DB×C ∼= (DB)C . Let f : B × C → D be a
fixed function. A function g : B → D is called representable by f at a fixed c0 ∈ C, when for any x ∈ B,
g(x) = f(x, c0) holds. In the other words, g = f̂(c0). So, the function f̂ : C → DB is onto if and only if
every function B → D is representable by f at some c0 ∈ C.
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Theorem 1.1 (Cantor) Assume the function α : D −→ D, for a set D, does not have any fixed point
(i.e., α(d) 6= d for all d ∈ D). Then for any set B and any function f : B×B → D there exists a function
g : B → D that is not representable by f (i.e., for all b ∈ B, g(−) 6= f(−, b)).
Proof. The desired function g : x 7→ α(f(x, x)) can be constructed as follows:
B ×B f - D
B
4B
6
g
- D
α
?
where 4B is the diagonal function of B (4B(x) = 〈x, x〉). If g is representable by f at b ∈ B, then
g(x) = f(x, b) for any x ∈ B, and in particular g(b) = f(b, b). On the other hand by the definition of
g we have g(x) = α(f(x, x)) and in particular (for x = b) g(b) = α(f(b, b)). It follows that f(b, b) is a
fixed–point of α; contradiction. Whence, the function g is not representable by f (at any b ∈ B). o
For any set A we have P(A) ∼= 2A where 2 = {0, 1} and 2A is the set of all functions from A to
2. So, Cantor’s theorem is equivalent to the non–existence of a surjection A → 2A. Putting it another
way, Cantor’s theorem says that for any function f : A × A → 2 there exists a function g : A → 2
which is not representable by f (at any member of A). In this new setting, Cantor’s proof goes as follows:
let 4A : A → A × A be the diagonal function of A (4A(x) = 〈x, x〉) and let α : 2 → 2 be a fixed
function. Define g : A → 2 by g(x) = α(f(4A(x))). If g is representable by f and fixed a ∈ A then
f(a, a) = g(a) = α(f(a, a)), which shows that α has a fixed–point (namely, f(a, a)). So, for reaching to
a contradiction, we need to take a function α : 2→ 2 which does not have any fixed–point; and the only
such function (without any fixed–point) is the negation function neg : 2 → 2, neg(i) = 1− i for i = 0, 1.
For a function F : A→P(A) let f : A× A→ 2 be defined as
f(a, a′) =
{
1 if a ∈ F (a′)
0 if a 6∈ F (a′)
The function g constructed by the diagram
A× A f - 2
A
4A
6
g
- 2
neg
?
is the characteristic function of the set DF = {x ∈ A | x 6∈ F (x)}. That g is not representable by f (at any
a ∈ A) is equivalent to saying that the set DF is not in the range of F (i.e., DF 6= F (a) for any a ∈ A).
In the rest of the paper we will fit some theorems in the diagram of the proof of Theorem 1.1 by varying
the sets B and D (and the functions f and α); most of the times D = 2 (and α = neg) will hold, just like
the above diagram.
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2 Euclid’s Theorem on the Infinitude of the Primes
Our first instance of Cantor’s Diagonal Proof starts with a surprise: the ancient theorem of Euclid stating
that there are infinitely many prime numbers. We use (almost) the classical proof of Euclid which seems far
from being a diagonal argument. Indeed there are many different proofs of this theorem in the literature,
and ours is not a new one; we just fit a proof in a diagonal diagram as above.
Theorem 2.1 (Euclid) There are infinitely many prime numbers in N.
Proof. Define the function f : N× N→ 2 as follows:
f(n,m) =
{
1 if all the prime factors of (n! + 1) are less than m
0 if some prime factor of (n! + 1) is greater than or equal to m
For example, f(4, 9) = 1 because 4! + 1 = 25 and it has no other prime factor but 5 and 5 < 9; it can
be seen that f(4,m) = 0 for all m 6 5 and f(4,m) = 1 for all m > 5. Indeed, for any n ∈ N we have
f(n, n) = 0 because no prime factor of n! + 1 can be less than n: for any d < n if d | (n! + 1) then from
d | n! it follows that d | 1 so d cannot be a prime. Now, consider the function g : N→ 2 constructed as
N× N f - 2
N
4N
6
g
- 2
neg
?
If all the prime numbers are less than p ∈ N then the function g is representable by f at p: for any n ∈ N,
f(n, p) = 1 and g(n) = neg(f(n, n)) = 1; whence g(n) = f(n, p) for all n ∈ N. A contradiction follows as
before: if such a number p exists, then f(p, p) becomes a fixed–point of neg. So, there exists no p ∈ N
such that all the primes are non–greater than p; whence there must be infinitely many prime numbers. o
This surprising argument, we believe, deserves another closer look: define the function F : N→P(N) by
F (n) = {x ∈ N | n is greater than or equal to all the prime factors of (x! + 1)}.
Cantor’s Theorem says that F cannot be surjective, or, more explicitly, DF = {n | n 6∈ F (n)} the (anti–
diagonal) set is not equal to any F (m). A number–theoretic argument shows that DF = N because for
any n all the prime factors of (n! + 1) are greater than n (see the proof of the above Theorem 2.1). On
the other hand if p ∈ N is the greatest prime, then F (p) = N = DF , a contradiction!
3 Some Other Proofs for Cantor’s Theorem
In 1997 late George Boolos published another proof [1] for Cantor’s Theorem, by showing that there
cannot be any injection from the powerset of a set to the set. This proof has been (implicitly or explicitly)
mentioned also in [6, 11] (but without referring to the earlier [1]). The first proof is essentially Cantor’s
Diagonal Argument.
Theorem 3.1 No function h : P(A)→ A can be injective.
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Proof. Let h : P(A)→ A be a function. Define f : P(A)×P(A)→ 2 by
f(X, Y ) =

1 if h(X) 6∈ Y
0 if h(X) ∈ Y
and let g : P(A)→ 2 be the following function
P(A)×P(A) f - 2
P(A)
4P(A)
6
g
- 2
neg
?
Let Dh = {a ∈ A | ∃Y ⊆ A (h(Y ) = a & a 6∈ Y )}. Note that for any X ⊆ A we have h(X) 6∈ X −→
h(X) ∈ Dh. We show that if h is one–to–one then g is representable by f at Dh. For, if h is injective then
for any X ⊆ A,
h(X)∈Dh −→ ∃Y ⊆A (h(Y )=h(X) & h(X) 6∈ Y )
−→ ∃Y (Y =X & h(X) 6∈ Y )
−→ h(X) 6∈ X
Whence, h(X) 6∈ X ←→ h(X) ∈ Dh for all X ⊆ A. So, for any X ⊆ A,
f(X,Dh) = 0 ←→ h(X) ∈ Dh
←→ h(X) 6∈ X
←→ f(X,X) = 1
←→ g(X) = neg(f(X,X)) = 0
Thus, g(X) = f(X,Dh). The contradiction (that neg possesses a fixed–point) follows as before, implying
that the function h cannot be injective. o
In fact the proof of the above theorem gives some more information than mere non–injectivity of any
function h : P(A)→ A, i.e., the existence of some C,D ⊆ A such that h(C) = h(D) and C 6= D.
Corollary 3.2 For any function h : P(A)→ A there are some C,D ⊆ A such that h(C) = h(D) ∈ D \C
(and so C 6= D).
Proof. For any X ⊆ A we had h(X) 6∈ X −→ h(X) ∈ Dh, whence h(Dh) 6∈ Dh −→ h(Dh) ∈ Dh, and
so h(Dh) ∈ Dh. Thus, there exists some Ch such that h(Ch) = h(Dh) and h(Dh) 6∈ Ch. So, for these
Ch,Dh ⊆ A we have h(Ch) = h(Dh) ∈ Dh \ Ch. o
Boolos notes in [1] that, in the above proof, though the set Dh had an explicit definition:
Dh = {a ∈ A | ∃Y ⊆ A (h(Y ) = a & a 6∈ Y )},
the set Ch was not defined explicitly, and its mere existence was shown. So, this proof of non–injectivity
was not constructive (did not explicitly construct two sets C and D such that h(C) = h(D) and C 6= D).
For a constructive proof, Boolos [1] proceeds as follows (cf. [6, 11]).
Fix a function h : P(A)→ A. Call a subset B ⊆ A an h–woset (h well ordered set) when there exists
a well ordering ≺ on B such that b = h({x ∈ B | x ≺ b}) for any b ∈ B. For example, {h(∅)} is an
h–woset, and indeed any non–empty h–woset must contain h(∅). Some other examples of h–wosets are
{h(∅), h({h(∅)})} and {h(∅), h({h(∅)}), h({h(∅), h({h(∅)})})}, etc.
We need the following two facts about the h–wosets:
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page 6 (of 12) Diagonalizing by Fixed–Points
(1) If B and C are two h–wosets with the well ordering relations ≺B and ≺C then exactly one (and only
one) of the following holds:
(i) (B,≺B) is an initial segment of (C,≺C), or
(ii) (C,≺C) is an initial segment of (B,≺B), or
(iii) (B,≺B) = (C,≺C).
(2) For any h–woset B, if h(B) 6∈ B then the set Φ(B) = B ∪ {h(B)} is an h–woset, and B is an initial
segment of Φ(B).
The statement (1) corresponds to Zermelo’s theorem that any two well ordered sets are comparable to
each other: either they are isomorphic or one of them is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other one.
It follows from (1) that the union of all h–wosets is an h–woset, denoted by Wh; thus Wh is the greatest
h–woset. For (2) let B be an h–woset with the well ordering ≺B such that h(B) 6∈ B. Then Φ(B) is an
h–woset with the well ordering ≺Φ(B)=≺B ∪ (B × {h(B)}).
The proof of Boolos [1] continues as follows (see also [6]): since Φ(Wh) =Wh then h(Wh) ∈ Wh. Also
for Vh = {x ∈ Wh | x ≺Wh h(Wh)} we have h(Wh) = h(Vh) and Wh 6= Vh because h(Wh) 6∈ Vh. Indeed,
the result is stronger than this (and Corollary 3.2) since the sets Wh and Vh were explicitly defined in a
way that Vh $ Wh holds and h(Vh) = h(Wh) ∈ Wh \ Vh. As another partial surprise we show that this
proof is also diagonal and fits in our universal framework.
Theorem 3.3 (Boolos) For any set A and function h : P(A)→ A there exist explicitly definable subsets
V,W ⊆ A such that V $ W and h(V ) = h(W ) ∈ W \ V .
Proof. Let Wh be the class of all h–wosets; i.e., all subsets B ⊆ A on which there exists a (unique) well
ordering ≺B such that b = h({x ∈ B | x ≺B b}) for all b ∈ B. Define Φ : Wh →Wh by
Φ(X) =
{
X ∪ {h(X)} if h(X) 6∈ X
X if h(X) ∈ X
with ≺Φ(X)=
{ ≺X ∪ (X × {h(X)}) if h(X) 6∈ X
≺X if h(X) ∈ X
Define the function f : Wh ×Wh → 2 by
f(X, Y ) =
{
1 if Φ(X) is isomorphic to Y or an initial segment of it
(
Φ(X) v Y )
0 if Y is isomorphic to an initial segment of Φ(X)
(
Y < Φ(X))
Let Wh be the greatest element of Wh (as above). Then f(X,Wh) = 1 for all X ∈Wh. We claim that
(∗) there exists some Z ∈Wh such that h(Z) ∈ Z or equivalently Φ(Z) = Z.
Assume (for a moment) that the claim is false. Then for all X ∈ Wh, X is (isomorphic to) an initial
segment of Φ(X); whence f(X,X) = 0. Let g : Wh → 2 be as
Wh ×Wh f - 2
Wh
4Wh
6
g
- 2
neg
?
It follows from assuming the falsity of the claim (∗) that
g(X) = neg(f(X,X)) = 1 = f(X,Wh).
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Thus g is representable by f (at Wh) and the usual contradiction (the existence of a fixed–point for neg)
follows. So, the claim (∗) is true, and there exists some Z ∈ Wh such that h(Z) ∈ Z or equivalently
Φ(Z) = Z. It can be seen that then Wh = Z, so Φ(Wh) = Wh and h(Wh) ∈ Wh. Whence, as above, for
the subset Vh = {x ∈ Wh | x ≺Wh h(Wh)} (⊆ A) we will have Vh $ Wh and h(Vh) = h(Wh) ∈ Wh \ Vh.
Note that both Wh and Vh were defined explicitly. o
Let us reiterate what was proved:
(Corollary 3.2) For any function h : P(A)→ A a subset Dh ⊆ A was explicitly defined in such a way that
there exists some Ch ⊆ A (without an explicit definition) such that Ch 6= Dh and h(Ch) = h(Dh) ∈ Dh \ Ch.
(Theorem 3.3) For any function h : P(A)→ A two subset Vh ⊆ A and Wh ⊆ A were explicitly defined in
such a way that Vh $Wh and h(Vh) = h(Wh) ∈ Wh \ Vh.
4 Yablo’s Paradox
To counter a general belief that all the paradoxes stem from a kind of circularity (or involve some self–
reference, or use a diagonal argument) Stephen Yablo designed a paradox in 1985 that seemingly avoided
self–reference ([12, 13]). Let us fix our reading of Yablo’s Paradox. Consider the sequence of sentences
{Yn}n∈N such that for each n ∈ N:
Yn is true ⇐⇒ ∀k > n (Yk is untrue).
The paradox follows from the following deductions. For each n ∈ N,
Yn is true =⇒ ∀k > n (Yk is untrue)
=⇒ (Yn+1 is untrue) and ∀k > n+ 1 (Yk is untrue)
=⇒ (Yn+1 is untrue) and (Yn+1 is true),
=⇒ Contradiction!
Thus Yn is not true. So,
∀k (Yk is untrue),
and in particular
∀k > 0 (Yk is untrue),
and so Y0 must be true (and untrue at the same time); contradiction!
4.1 Propositional Linear Temporal Logic
The propositional linear temporal logic (LTL) is a logical formalism that can refer to time; in LTL one can
encode formulae about the future, e.g., a condition will eventually be true, a condition will be true until
another fact becomes true, etc. LTL was first proposed for the formal verification of computer programs
in 1977 by Amir Pnueli [9]. For a modern introduction to LTL and its syntax and semantics see e.g. [7].
Two modality operators in LTL that we will use are the “next” modality # and the “always” modality 2.
The formula #ϕ holds (in the current moment) when ϕ is true in the “next step”, and the formula 2ϕ
is true (in the current moment) when ϕ is true “now and forever” (“always in the future”). In the other
words, 2 is the reflexive and transitive closure of #. It can be seen that the formula #¬ϕ ←→ ¬#ϕ is
always true (is a law of LTL, see T1 on page 27 of [7]), since ϕ is untrue in the next step if and only if it
is not the case that “ϕ is true in the next step”. Also the formula #2ψ is true when ψ is true from the
next step onward, that is ψ holds in the next step, and the step after that, and the step after that, etc.
The same holds for 2#ψ; indeed the formula #2ψ ←→ 2#ψ is a law of LTL (T12 on page 28 of [7]).
Whence, we have the equivalences #2¬ϕ←→ 2#¬ϕ←→ 2¬#ϕ in LTL.
The intended models (semantics) of LTL are systems 〈N,〉 where  ⊆ N×Atoms is an arbitrary relation
which can be extended to all formulas as follows:
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page 8 (of 12) Diagonalizing by Fixed–Points
n  ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if n  ϕ and n  ψ,
n  ¬ϕ if and only if n 6 ϕ,
n  #ϕ if and only if (n+ 1)  ϕ,
n  2ϕ if and only if m  ϕ for every m ≥ n.
A formula τ is called valid (an LTL tautology) when for any model 〈N,〉 and any n ∈ N we have n  τ .
Here we can readily check the validity of the formula #¬ϕ←→ ¬#ϕ as follows:
n  #¬ϕ⇐⇒ (n+ 1)  ¬ϕ⇐⇒ (n+ 1) 6 ϕ⇐⇒ n 6 #ϕ⇐⇒ n  ¬#ϕ.
Also the validity of #2ψ ←→ 2#ψ can be readily checked:
n  #2ϕ ⇐⇒ (n+ 1)  2ϕ
⇐⇒ ∀k ≥ n+ 1(k  ϕ)
⇐⇒ ∀k ≥ n[(k + 1)  ϕ]
⇐⇒ ∀k ≥ n(k  #ϕ)
⇐⇒ n  2#ϕ.
Now we show the non–existence of a formula Y that satisfies the equivalence
Y ←→#2¬Y (←→2#¬Y ←→ 2¬#Y );
in other words Y is a fixed–point of the operator x 7→ #2¬x (≡ 2#¬x ≡ 2¬#x). Following [14] we can
demonstrate this by the following diagram
LTL× LTL f - 2
LTL
4LTL
6
g
- 2
neg
?
where LTL is the set of sentences in the language of LTL and f is defined by
f(X, Y ) =
{
1 if X 6≡ #2¬Y
0 if X ≡ #2¬Y
Here, g is the characteristic function of all the Yablo–like sentences, the sentences which claim that all
they say in the future (from the next step onward) is untrue.
Theorem 4.1 For any ϕ, the formula
(
ϕ↔ #2¬ϕ) is not provable in LTL.
Proof. If LTL proves ψ ↔ #2¬ψ for some (propositional) formula ψ, then for a model 〈N,〉:
(i) If m  ψ for some m, then m  #2¬ψ so (m + 1)  2¬ψ, hence (m + i)  ¬ψ for all i ≥ 1.
In particular, (m + 1)  ¬ψ and (m + j)  ¬ψ for all j ≥ 2 which implies (m + 2)  2¬ψ or
(m+ 1)  #2¬ψ so (m+ 1)  ψ, a contradiction!
(ii) So for all k we have k  ¬ψ or equivalently k  ¬#2¬ψ or k  #¬2¬ψ, thus (k + 1)  ¬2¬ψ;
hence (k + n)  ψ for some n ≥ 1, contradicting (i)!
So, LTL6` (ϕ↔ #2¬ϕ) for all formulas ϕ. o
The above proof is very similar to Yablo’s argument (in his paradox) presented at the beginning of this
section, and this goes to say that Yablo’s paradox has turned into a genuine mathematico–logical theorem
(in LTL) for the first time in Theorem 4.1∗.
∗Note that Yablo’s paradox has already been used to give new proofs of some old theorems e.g. in [3] (for Go¨del’s theorem)
or in [8] (for Rosser’s Theorem); but no new theorem had come out of Yablo’s paradox.
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Diagonalizing by Fixed–Points page 9 (of 12)
4.2 Priest’s Inclosure Schema
In 1997 Priest [10] has shown the existence of a formula Y (x) which satisfies Y (n)↔ ∀k>n ¬T (pY (k)q) for
every n ∈ N, where T (x) is a (supposedly truth) predicate; here pψq is the (Go¨del) code of the formula ψ.
Here we construct a formula Y (x) which, for every n ∈ N, satisfies the formula Y (n)↔ ∀k>n Ψ(pY (k)q)
for some Π1 formula Ψ, by using the Recursion Theorem (of Kleene); for recursion–theoretic definitions
and theorems see e.g. [4]†. Let T denote Kleene’s T Predicate, and for a fixed Π1 formula Ψ(x) let r be the
recursive function defined by r(x, y) = µ z
(
z >x & ¬Ψ(p¬∃uT(y, z, u)q)); note that ¬Ψ is a Σ1 formula.
By the S–m–n theorem there exists a primitive recursive function s such that ϕs(y)(x) = r(x, y); here ϕn
denotes the unary recursive function with (Go¨del) code n, so ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · lists all the unary recursive
functions. By Kleene’s Recursion Theorem, there exists some (Go¨del code) e such that ϕe = ϕs(e). Whence,
ϕe(x) = ϕs(e)(x) = r(x, e) = µ z
(
z>x & ¬Ψ(p¬∃uT(e, z, u)q)).
So, for any x ∈ N we have ∃uT(e, x, u) ⇔ ϕe(x) ↓ ⇔ ∃z
(
z > x & ¬Ψ(p¬∃uT(e, z, u)q)), or in the other
words we have the equivalence
¬∃uT(e, x, u) ⇐⇒ ∀z>x Ψ(p¬∃uT(e, z, u)q).
Thus if we let Y(v) = ¬∃zT(e, v, z), then for any n ∈ N we have
Y(n)↔ ∀k>n Ψ(pY(k)q).
Let us note that Yablo’s paradox occurs when Ψ is taken to be an untruth (or non-satisfaction) predicate;
in fact one might be tempted to take ¬SatΠ,1(x, ∅) (see Theorem 1.75 of [5]) as Ψ(x); but by construction
SatΠ,1(x, ∅) is Π1 and so ¬SatΠ,1(x, ∅) is Σ1, and our proof works for Ψ ∈ Π1 only (otherwise the function
r could not be recursive). Actually, the above construction shows that the predicate SatΠ,1(x, ∅) (in [5])
cannot be Σ1, which is equivalent to saying that the set of (arithmetical) true Π1 sentences cannot be
recursively enumerable, and this is a consequence of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem‡.
In [10] Priest also introduced his Inclosure Schema and showed that Yablo’s paradox is amenable in it
(see also [2]). In the following, we show that Priest’s Inclosure Schema can fit in Yanofsky’s framework
[14]. With some inessential modification for better reading, Priest’s inclosure schema is defined to be a
triple 〈Ω,Θ, δ〉 where
• Ω is a set of objects;
• Θ ⊆P(Ω) is a property of subsets of Ω such that Ω ∈ Θ;
• δ : Θ→ Ω is a function such that for each X ∈ Θ, δ(X) 6∈ X.
That any inclosure schema is contradictory can be seen from the fact that by the second item δ(Ω) must
be defined and belong to Ω, but at the same time by the third item δ(Ω) 6∈ Ω. We show how this can be
proved by the non–existence of a fixed–point for the negation function.
Theorem 4.2 If an inclosure schema exists, then negation has a fixed–point.
Proof. Assume 〈Ω,Θ, δ〉 is a (hypothetical) inclosure schema. Put f : Θ×Θ→ 2 as
f(X, Y ) =
{
1 if δ(X) ∈ Y
0 if δ(X) 6∈ Y
†Of course the mere existence of such a formula Y (x) follows directly from Go¨del’s Diagonal Lemma ([4])
‡This line of reasoning also shows the non–existence of a formula θ(x) (in arithmetical languages) which can satisfy the
equivalence θ(x)↔ ∀y>x¬θ(y) in N or in a theory containing Peano’s Arithmetic.
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and let g : Θ→ 2 be defined as
Θ×Θ f - 2
Θ
4Θ
6
g
- 2
neg
?
We show that g is representable by f at Ω. For every X∈Θ we have f(X,Ω) = 1. On the other hand by
the property of δ, for any X∈Θ, δ(X) 6∈X, and so f(X,X) = 0, thus g(X) = neg(f(X,X)) = 1. Whence
g(X) = f(X,Ω) for all X∈Θ. o
5 Dominating Functions
Ackermann’s function is a recursive (computable) function which is not primitive recursive (see e.g. [4]).
The class of primitive recursive functions is the smallest class which contains the initial functions, i.e.,
• the constant zero function z(x) = 0,
• the successor function s(x) = x+ 1 and
• the projection functions pni (x1, · · · , xn) = xi for any 1 6 i 6 n ∈ N,
and is closed under
• composition and
• primitive recursion,
i.e., for primitive recursive functions f, f1, · · · , fn the function comp(f ; f1, . . . , fn) defined by (x1, · · · , xm) 7→
f(f1(x1, · · · , xm), . . . , fn(x1, · · · , xm)) is also primitive recursive, and also for primitive recursive functions
g and h the function prim.rec(g, h) defined by (x1, · · · , xn, 0) 7→ g(x1, · · · , xn) and
(x1, · · · , xn, x+ 1) 7→ h
(
prim.rec(g, h)(x1, · · · , xn, x), x1, · · · , xn, x
)
is also primitive recursive.
The class of recursive functions contains the same initial functions and is closed under composition,
primitive recursion, and also
• minimization,
i.e., for recursive function f the function min(f) defined by (x1, · · · , xn) 7→ y where y is the least nat-
ural number that satisfies f(x1, · · · , xn, y) = 0 is also recursive; note that then for all z < y we have
f(x1, · · · , xn, z) 6= 0, and if there is no such y then min(f) is undefined on x1, · · · , xn.
In fact, Ackermann’s function is not only a non–primitive recursive (and a recursive) function, but
it also dominates all the primitive recursive functions (see e.g. [4]). A function g is said to dominate a
function f (or f is dominated by g) when for all but finitely many x’s the inequality g(x) > f(x) holds.
Here we show a way of dominating a given enumerable list of functions by diagonalization. Before that let
us note that the set of all primitive recursive functions can be (recursively) enumerated: let #(f) denote
the (Go¨del) code of the function f and define the Go¨del code of a primitive recursive function inductively:
• #(z) = 1, • #(s) = 2, • #(pni ) = 2i · 3n,
• #(comp(f ; f1, . . . , fn)) = 5#(f) · 7#(f1) · · · p#(fn)n+2 , and • #(prim.rec(g, h)) = 3#(g) · 5#(h),
where pi is the i−th prime number (thus, p0 = 2, p1 = 3, p2 = 5, p3 = 7, · · · ). Let νn be the primitive
recursive function with code n, if n is a code of such a function; if n is not a code for a primitive recursive
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function (such as n = 3 or n = 10) then let νn be the constant zero function z. So, ν0, ν1, ν2, · · · lists
all the primitive recursive functions. We show the existence of a unary function that dominates all the
functions νi’s in the above list.
Theorem 5.1 For a list of functions f1, f2, f3, · · · : N → N, there exists a unary function N → N that
dominates them all.
Proof. Define the function f : N × N → N as f(n,m) = max(i6n) fi(m) and let g be defined by the
following diagram where s is the successor function:
N× N f - N
N
4N
6
g
- N
s
?
In fact, the function g : N → N is defined as g(x) = max(i6x) fi(x) + 1. Since the successor function does
not have any fixed–point, the function g is not equal to any of fi’s. Moreover, g dominates all the fi’s,
since for any m ∈ N and any x>m by the definition of g we have g(x)>max(i6x) fi(x)>fm(x). o
For dominating the primitive recursive functions (some of which are not unary) we can consider their
unarized version: let ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, · · · be the list of unary functions N → N defined as ρi(x) = νi(x, · · · , x).
Whence ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, · · · lists all the unary primitive recursive functions, and the construction of Theorem 5.1
produces a unary function which dominates all the unary primitive recursive functions. Let us note that
the function g obtained in the proof of Theorem 5.1 is computable (intuitively) and so recursive (by
Church’s Thesis); one can show directly that the above function g is recursive (without appealing to
Church’s Thesis) by some detailed work through Recursion Theory (cf. e.g. [4]).
6 Conclusions
There are many interesting questions and suggestions for further research at the end of [14] which motivated
the research presented in this paper; most of the questions remain unanswered as of today. The proposed
schema, i.e., the diagram of the proof of Theorem 1.1, can be used as a criterion for testing whether
an argument is diagonal or not. What makes this argument (of the non–existence of a fixed–point for
α : D → D) diagonal is the diagonal function 4B : B → B × B. In most of our arguments we had
D = 2 = {0, 1} and α = neg by which the proof was constructed by diagonalizing out of the function
f : B × B → D. Only in Theorem 5.1 we had D = N and α = s (the successor function) which was
used for generating a dominating function. We could have used the diagonalizing out argument by setting
D = 2 = {0, 1} and α = neg for the function f˜ : N× N→ 2, defined by
f˜(n,m) =
{
0 if fn(m) = 0
1 if fn(m) 6= 0
Then the constructed function g˜ : N→ 2 by g˜(n) = neg(f˜(n, n)) differs from all the functions fi’s (because
g˜(i) 6= fi(i) for all i). So, this way one could construct a non–primitive recursive (but recursive) function,
though this function does not dominate all the primitive recursive functions.
For other exciting questions and examples of theorems or paradoxes which seem to be self–referential
we refer the reader to the last section of [14]. It will be nice to see some of those proposals or other more
phenomena fit in the above universal diagonal schema.
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